Author's Abstract: COPYRIGHT Society for the Psychological Study of Reporting Service 1994.

This article reviews the development of interactive problem solving as an unofficial approach to the resolution of international conflicts, especially as we have applied it to the Israeli--Palestinian conflict. The article describes the concept of the continuing workshop, which represents our latest attempt to maximize the political impact of interactive problem solving. After presenting the goals, terms of reference, and ground rules of such workshops, the paper examines their potential contribution to the larger process of conflict resolution. The principles of the continuing workshop have been applied in a series of meetings between high-ranking Israeli and Palestinian participants. The paper discusses some of the practical issues confronted in this effort, such as preparation, selection of participants, and the third-party role; and assesses the contribution of this continuing workshop to ransforming the relationship between the two societies in conflict.

Full Text: COPYRIGHT Society for the Psychological Study of Reporting Service 1994. Use of this article is restricted to class use in Spring 1997 of internet course in Conflict Resolution. This article may not otherwise be reproduced or distributed without written permission.

Underlying traditional forms of conflict settlement is the assumption that the disputed resources, interests, or goals arc negotiable and that a compromise is achievable within the existing balance of power between the parties (Nye & Keohane, 1972).

Generally speaking, this assumption is met in situations where the conflict is over distributable resources, the actors are nation-states, and there is a third party with adequate leverage over the disputants. Theories of "ripeness" and proper timing for intervention fit well within this conception of conflict (Haass, 1991; Zartman, 1985). However, protracted ethnic conflicts are often over non-negotiable human needs--for identity, security, recognition, political participation, inclusion in political decision making, or distributive justice (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1987; Mitchell, 1990). These needs cannot be easily suppressed, socialized away, or permanently controlled. Moreover, ethnic conflicts are more amorphous than wars between states since they pit loosely defined populations with shifting leadership coalitions against one another. The parties to the conflict are often societies, not governments of nation-states. To be lasting, a settlement must adequately address the unmet human needs of both parties; otherwise new crises will soon emerge. The difficulties in the resolution of conflicts such as those in the former Yugoslavia or Soviet republics, the Middle East, and Africa reflect the complexity of ethnic conflicts and their resistance to traditional approaches.

If solutions to intractable ethnic conflicts are to meet the unmet needs of all parties, rather than award the spoils to the victor, the parties need an opportunity to explore and comprehend each other's needs, concerns, and constraints and to work together to develop ideas for solutions that respond equally to both sets of needs and concerns. Only such solutions stand a chance of being acceptable to the societies, which are, in effect, the parties in intractable ethnic conflicts.

Analytical interaction between adversaries is not possible within the framework of power bargaining, official negotiations, arbitration, and similar forms of conflict management. Official negotiations are marked by a high degree of publicity, a process of representing and defending positions, limited time frames, pressure for instant decision making, and above all, commitment to winning the conflict with the enemy. Recognizing these limitations, practitioners of unofficial conflict resolution have developed and applied several approaches that can complement the official process. One such approach is the interactive problem-solving model on which the continuing workshop described in this paper is based. The practice of interactive problem solving is informed by a set of assumptions about interethnic conflict derived from social-psychological analysis (Kelman, 1993), as summarized below.

First, although war and peace--and international relations as a whole--are societal and intersocietal processes, which cannot be reduced to the level of individual behavior, there are many aspects of international conflict and conflict resolution for which the individual represents the most appropriate unit of analysis. Most important, the satisfaction of the needs of both parties--the needs of human individuals as articulated through their core identity groups--is the ultimate criterion for a mutually satisfactory resolution of their conflict (Burton, 1990; Kelman, 1990). By pushing behind the parties' incompatible positions and exploring the identity and security concerns that underlie them, it often becomes possible to develop mutually satisfactory solutions, since identity, security, and other psychological needs are not inherently zero sum.

Both in our theoretical work and in our practice, we need to determine the relevant points of entry for psychological analysis--those points in the theoretical model or in the diplomatic process at which the cognitions of individuals and the interactions between individuals can play a specific role in determining outcomes. Thus, we can identify certain processes central to conflict resolution--such as empathy, insight, creative problem solving, and learning--that of necessity take place at the level of individuals and interaction between individuals.

Problem-solving workshops provide a setting in which these processes can occur. Changes at the level of individuals can then be fed back into the political debate and the decision making in the two communities, thus becoming vehicles for change at the macrolevel.

Second, international conflict must be viewed as not merely an intergovernmental or interstate phenomenon, but also as an intersocietal phenomenon. An important implication of the intersocietal view of conflict is that negotiations and third-party efforts should ideally be directed not merely to a settlement of the conflict in the form of a brokered political agreement, but to its resolution. Conflict resolution in this deeper and more lasting sense implies arrangements and accommodations that emerge out of the interaction between the parties themselves, that address the basic needs of both parties, and to which the parties are committed. Only this kind of solution is capable of transforming the relationship between societies locked into a protracted conflict that engages their collective identities and existential concerns. The real test of conflict resolution in deep-rooted conflict is how much the process by which agreements are constructed and the nature of the resultant agreements contribute to transformation of the relationship between the parties.

Third, conflict is an interactive process with an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic. The needs and fears of parties involved in an intense conflict relationship impose cognitive constraints on their processing of information, such as underestimating the occurrence and possibility of change (Jervis, 1976; Kelman, 1979). Demonic images of the enemy and virtuous images of the self that develop on both sides contribute to escalatory dynamics of interaction and to resistance to change in the conflict relationship (Bronfenbrenner, 1961; White, 1965). Moreover, a set of "conflict norms" (Kelman, 1979; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) that encourages each party to adopt militant and threatening postures governs the interaction between the parties and creates self-fulfilling prophecies.

Conflict resolution efforts require the reversal of these patterns of interaction and the promotion of an interaction pattern conducive to sharing of perspectives, differentiation of the enemy image, insight into the processes that contribute to escalation, and joint thinking. Interactive problem-solving workshops provide the setting for such change to occur (Rouhana, 1993).

Fourth, there is a need to broaden the range of influence processes employed in international conflict relationships. It is necessary to move beyond influence strategies based on threats, and even to expand and refine strategies based on promises and positive incentives. Conflict resolution efforts, by searching for solutions that satisfy the needs of both parties, create opportunities for mutual influence by way of responsiveness to each other's needs. They can demonstrate the possibility of influencing the other through one's own actions. A key element in this process is mutual reassurance. In existential conflicts, in particular, parties can encourage each other to negotiate seriously by reducing both sides' fears--not just, as more traditional strategic analysts maintain, by increasing their pain. At the macrolevel, this broader conception of influence processes calls for a shift in emphasis from deterrence and compellance to mutual reassurance. The use of influence processes based on responsiveness to the other's needs and fears and search for ways of benefiting the other can do more than affect specific behaviors of the other. It can contribute to a creative redefinition of the conflict, to joint discovery of win--win solutions, and to transformation of the relationship between the parties.

The interactive problem-solving approach, on which the continuing workshop is based, reflects these assumptions.

Background: The Evolution of Interactive Problem Solving

Interactive problem solving is an unofficial third-party approach designed to contribute to the resolution of international and intercommunal conflict. The approach, which draws heavily on the work of John Burton (1969), was developed by Herbert Kelman in cooperation with colleagues over the last 20 years (Kelman, 1972, 1979, 1986, 1992; Kelman & Cohen, 1976). The core element of the approach consists of problem-solving workshops that bring together politically involved members of conflicting societies for direct, private, unofficial interaction, under the guidance of a panel of social scientists knowledgeable about international conflict, group process, and the geographic region in which the conflict takes place. The setting, ground rules, procedures, agenda, and third-party interventions are all designed to encourage and enable representatives of the conflicting parties to share their differing perspectives, to engage in a process of joint thinking and problem solving, and to inject the ideas that emerge from this process into the political debate and decision making within their respective communities. The third party plays a facilitative role: It sets the stage and intervenes in ways that make it possible for creative new ideas for promoting negotiations and resolving the conflict to emerge out of the interaction between the parties themselves. We have applied this approach primarily (though not exclusively) to workshops between Israelis and Palestinians (Cohen, Kelman, Miller, & Smith, 1977; Kelman, 1979; Rouhana, Kahanoff, & Macover, 1987).

Until recently, the workshops that we organized were all one-time events. Although some Israelis and Palestinians, as individuals, participated in several such events, each workshop was self-contained. Beginning in the fall of 1990, however, we took a major step forward in our work by organizing a continuing workshop--that is, a workshop in which participants committed themselves to a series of meetings over an extended period. This continuing workshop represents a new departure in our program and a significant step in the evolution of the interactive problem-solving approach--although it should be noted that there have been earlier experiences with similar groups meeting on a continuing basis, notably the Dartmouth Seminars, in which American and Soviet citizens met repeatedly over some 30 years (Chufrin & Saunders, 1993; Saunders, 1992).

The continuing workshop does not represent the first variation on our workshop design. The more than 25 Palestinian-Israeli workshops that Kelman and his colleagues have conducted over the years have actually differed in several key respects: the number of participants (from 2 to 12), the size of the third party (from 1 to over 20 when workshops have been conducted in the context of a seminar on international conflict and the seminar students have been included in the third party; see Kelman, 1979), the political influence of participants (from preinfluential to highly influential), the gender of participants (from all women to mostly men), and the audience (from none at all in the typical case to a selected semipublic audience for a workshop held at the meetings of the International Society of Political Psychology in Amsterdam in 1986).

Given this history of variation in workshop format in response to special requirements and opportunities, while adhering to a set of basic operative principles, one can think of the continuing workshop as yet another variation in the evolution of the approach. However, we feel that it represents a qualitative shift in the use of the approach and its potential contribution to the resolution of a particular conflict (the Israeli--Palestinian conflict in this case), to the transformation of the relationship between the parties, and to the reconceptualization of international relationships more generally.

The Continuing Workshop: An Overview

The principles that govern the continuing workshop and most of its characteristics follow directly from the workshop approach that has evolved over the years (Kelman, 1992). However, due to the time constraints and the limited opportunity to follow-up and build on the proceedings of a one-time workshop, our earlier work has not provided optimal conditions for testing the potential value of interactive problem solving. The continuing workshop is better suited to fulfilling the potential of this method because it eases the time constraints of the one-time workshops and because it provides for continuity of interaction by the same group of participants over an extended period.

Goals

The continuing workshop was designed to provide a private, unofficial forum in which influential members of both conflicting parties could freely discuss their conflict with the express goal of fostering joint thinking and producing new ideas about the future relationship between the two communities. The dynamics of protracted conflict preclude joint thinking in the normal course of interaction, because each side naturally focuses on how it can advance its position at the expense of the other. Thus, ideas offered in such interactions are always based only on one side's needs, assumptions, and definitions. Even when the parties interact in traditional diplomatic activities, such as negotiations, joint thinking does not characterize the process. This is particularly true of adversaries embroiled in identity-related conflicts.

By creating a forum where joint thinking is possible, the continuing workshop provides a unique and rare opportunity for adversaries to work together to create new ideas that can be repeatedly and immediately tested against both parties' perspectives. This greatly enhances the probability that such ideas will be acceptable and hence communicable to both sides in the larger conflict.

The continuing workshop, like the one-time workshops that we have carried out over the years, takes place under academic auspices. The academic context has many advantages for such an enterprise, since it allows the parties to interact in a relatively noncommittal way and provides an alternative set of norms that can counteract the norms that typically govern interactions among conflicting parties (Kelman, 1992, p. 74). When workshops were first organized in the 1970s, meetings between Israelis and Palestinians were rare and still considered illegitimate by significant segments of the societies in conflict. The academic context was particularly helpful at that time in providing an acceptable framework for meeting with members of the enemy camp. Even in the 1990s, the academic auspices have been important to some of the participants of the continuing workshop by helping them fulfill legal or political requirements for meeting with their adversaries.

Many of our one-time, self-contained workshops have taken place not only under academic auspices, but in the context of a graduate seminar on international conflict. The students in the seminar (who have numbered 20 or more in recent years) are not mere observers, but participate in the workshop as apprentice members of the third party. However, despite painstaking efforts to minimize audience effects, they cannot be entirely eliminated with a third party of this magnitude. The high degree of privacy that has prevailed in the continuing workshop (as well as in some of the one-time workshops) has enhanced the potential for joint thinking and careful consideration of new political ideas emerging from the discussions. Above all, the continuing workshop has enhanced the potential for joint thinking--beyond what is possible in one-time events--by providing the time frame necessary for this process to fulfill itself.

Participants

A group of high-level, politically influential Palestinians and Israelis agreed to take part in a series of three meetings over the course of 1990--1991 with the express purpose of engaging in a process of interactive problem solving: thinking jointly of new avenues, means, and ideas to move the two societies toward a resolution of their conflict. At the end of the third meeting (in August 1991) the group decided to continue and has since held additional meetings in May and July of 1992. The 6 Palestinian and 5 Israeli participants in these meetings are all individuals with broad experience and high credibility in their respective communities, who are close to the center of the political mainstream, and who occupy positions--in political organizations, academic institutions, think tanks, or the media--that enable them to have a major impact on the framing of issues and the perception of available options by decision makers, political elites, and the general public.

The third party has consisted of 4 members. In addition to the authors, who initiated the undertaking, organized the workshops, and selected the participants, the third party has included Harold Saunders, Director of International Relations at the Kettering Foundation and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and C. R. Mitchell, director of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. A team of 4-5 assistants oversaw note taking and organizational details. No other observers were allowed.

Meeting Structure

Each workshop lasted three to five days. The first and second workshops each began with two preworkshop sessions, in which the third party met separately with the Israeli and the Palestinian participants for four hours. All other sessions (or subsessions of smaller working groups) included all parties. The vast majority of discussions were held in plenary sessions. On some occasions, the group was divided into mixed subgroups to work on defined issues. In all sessions, trained assistants took notes as close to verbatim as possible; none of the proceedings were recorded.

On each full day, participants met for four sessions of 1 1/2-2 hours each. Sessions were held in the hotel or conference center in which all participants stayed. Meals were served in separate rooms, designed for workshop participants only, in order to give the participants more opportunities to interact in a relaxed informal setting. We also arranged special dinners, some hosted by the organizers when the workshops were held in Cambridge, or other events, such as a group trip, when the workshops were held in Europe.

Chronology

The first of the three originally planned workshops was held in Cambridge, in November 1990, at a time in which avenues for political solutions of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians seemed completely closed off (Rouhana, 1992). Participants came to the workshop deeply pessimistic, with the sense that events were rapidly spiraling out of control on the ground and that violence was on the rise. The deteriorating situation was brought home to the participants by the fact that 2 Palestinian invitees were not granted permission by the Israeli authorities to leave the West Bank to attend the meeting.

The second workshop, in June 1991, was also held in Cambridge. It followed the Gulf War, in which previously established channels of communication between Israelis and Palestinians in the region had broken down over mutual grievances during the Gulf crisis and the ensuing war. The Israelis were enraged by Palestinian support for Iraq during the Gulf War, and Palestinian participants were equally angry about the severe restrictions imposed on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza during the war.

The third workshop was held in Bellagio, Italy, at the end of August 1991, as the United States was heavily involved in laying the groundwork for a peace process to exploit the "window of opportunity" created after the Gulf War.

Over the course of the three workshops, participants worked jointly on difficult political issues. In the third workshop, they undertook the task of drafting mutually acceptable formulations of four issues: (1) the finality of a negotiated agreement, (2) the settlements in the occupied territories, (3) Palestinian nationhood and self-determination, and (4) the Palestinian right of return. The group achieved agreement on written formulations of the first three issues; on the fourth, great progress was made but no agreement was reached, mainly due to lack of time.

Although the third workshop concluded the series to which the third party and the participants had originally committed themselves, the participants expressed an interest in continuing the meetings. In the light of the working relationship achieved over the course of three meetings and the joint work done in the third meeting, many participants expressed the view that it would be a loss to discontinue the workshop just at that point. The organizers agreed to explore the possibility of further meetings, but asked the participants to support the effort. Two participants representing the two groups sent a joint letter urging the organizers to continue their efforts to arrange further meetings in order to capitalize on the working relationship and the level of cooperation achieved between the participants. But at the end of October 1991, the official peace process sponsored by the United States (and the former Soviet Union) opened with the Madrid Conference. The commencement of official talks between the parties transformed the conflict dynamics and introduced a new reality in which the possible reconvening of the workshop took on new meaning.

Three new factors now had to be considered. First, all of our Israeli-Palestinian workshops up to that point, including the three meetings of the continuing workshop, took place in the prenegotiation stage. Although it was always assumed that problem-solving workshops can make useful contributions during the negotiation stage itself (Kelman, 1972, p. 202, and 1986, p. 313), we had no previous experience with workshops at that stage. Before reconvening the continuing workshop, therefore, it was necessary to adjust its methods, goals, and functions to the new realities created by the onset of the formal talks. Second, some participants felt that the meetings could be construed by the public as a parallel process to the official talks. Even if this perception were not based on fact, they argued that it might have harmful effects on the workshop and its participants. Third, when the negotiation teams were named, it turned out that most of the Palestinian participants in the continuing workshop became involved in the official process as negotiators or advisors. It thus became necessary to consider whether the overlap in membership between the official process of the negotiations and the unofficial process of the continuing workshop might create conflicts for one or both of the parties.

In view of these considerations, we decided to hold consultation meetings with the participants to explore whether the continuing workshop could and ought to be reconvened, and if so, what functions it should perform in the new political context. Three such consultations with subgroups of participants were held in Washington, The Hague, and Jerusalem in May 1992, shortly before the Israeli election of June 23. Each consultation lasted one day and included both Israeli and Palestinian participants, along with 2 or 3 members of the third party. On the basis of the consultations, we organized a fourth meeting of the continuing workshop, which took place in Leuven, Belgium, at the end of July 1992. Four Palestinian and 4 Israeli participants took part in this workshop, along with 3 members of the third-party team and 4 members of the staff. The participants discussed the outcome of the Israeli elections and its implications for the peace talks. As a new government had just been formed in Israel, the workshop focused on that government's ideas for the interim self-government in the West Bank and Gaza and on the acceptability of these ideas to the Palestinian community. At the end of this workshop, the Israeli participants argued for the continuation of the project, while Palestinian participants were supportive but somewhat ambivalent because of their role in the peace talks. We proposed to terminate this series of the continuing workshop in order to take stock and review the functions and composition of further workshops. However, participants from both parties resisted this closure and encouraged us to keep our options open.

We are currently working on a reformulation and partial reconstitution of the continuing workshop suitable to the present stage of the negotiations. The principles of the problem-solving workshop remain at the center of the new formulation, but the specific functions have to be adapted to the new political situation.