Evangelical Protestantism and the Fundamentalist Realignment in Latin America

A Report to the Third Roundtable of the President of the Socialist International,
Les Intègrismes à l'Aube du XXIième Siecle
La Fondation Jean Jaures/ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, … La Maison des Centaliens, Paris,
le 20-21 Avril, 1996.

Professor John G. Mason,
Political Science Department,
William Paterson College of New Jersey.

Preface

I should begin by prefacing my remarks with a few disclaimers because I am speaking today about evangelical Protestants as an "outsider" in a double sense. Firstly, I belong to the tiny secular minority - which despite the strong representation of the "culture of disbelief" among university and media elites, amounts at most to 7% of the overall population of the United States. Secondly, having been raised as a "mainline protestant" in the Northern US, I can not help but approach the whole issue of protestant revivalism with a certain trepidation. For me revivalism appears a Southern, Bible-belt phenomenon which is both "foreign" and frightening - despite its success over the past 40 years in spreading out from its old Southern base to establish itself across the United States and across Latin America as well.

Finally, I should add that I am well aware of the anomalous position I find myself in as "un estadounidense," who presumes to speak about Latin American cultures and societies which are not his own. I hope that this act of cultural usurpation will seem less outrageous once we take into account both the North American origin and moral outlook of many of the religious movements at work in Latin America today and the scope and importance of the cultural and population exchanges which are occurring between North and South America.

I. The Current Realignment of Latin Christianity.

In thinking about the impact of contemporary evangelical and pentecostal fundamentalist churches in Latin America, we can begin by seeing them as the force driving a regional realignment of religious institutions and identities of historic importance. In Today's Latin America, Evangelical Churches are on the rise, while the Roman Catholic Church is in retreat - a development which mirrors the situation north of the Rio Grande where mainstream "North American" liturgical churches from the Anglicans and Lutherans to the Roman Catholics also are on the decline1. The rapid growth of Evangelical protestants in Latin America over the past twenty years is especially striking because it has occurred within a region of the World where state and society have historically defined themselves in relation to (and often against) the singular tradition and unitary apparatus of the Roman Catholic Church2.

The "hollowing out" of Roman Catholicism has been called the phenomena of the "empty cloister," and deserves some comment. Beginning with the Spanish Conquest, the association of Church and Empire in New Spain was especially close, which meant that the Catholic Church was a full partner in the imperial system3. The Church occupied the vast territories of the empire, enveloping the emerging colonial societies within the embrace of its ecclesiastical administration, but never properly "christianizing them4." This elitist colonial church gave Latin societies a catholic coloration which is often only "nominal5," and did not leave much room for the development of indigenous "popular" Churches with real organizational presence among the population. More particularly, it left large numbers of poor people in the countryside or in the marginalized urban "informal economy," outside its structures - both unorganized and "unchurched." Even today the Latin American Churches suffer form a chronic shortage of candidates for the priesthood and relies on importing one half of its clergy from other regions of the world6. No wonder then, that Pope Jean Paul II declared Latin America a "Catholic land" crying out for a "new evangelicism" by Roman Catholic missions at the Santo Domingo Conference of Bishops in 19927.

Pentecostal and Evangelical churches have moved into this social and "spirituals" vacuum. Less than 200,000 in 1916, Latin American Protestants numbered more than 48 millions in 1990 - of whom three-quarters are estimated to belong to pentecostal and evangelical denominations which subscribe to a "fundamentalist" definition of their faith8. Taken in this strictly religious sense, protestant fundamentalists subscribe to four theologically conservative principles which stress acceptance of Jesus Christ as one's personal savior; the "inerrency" of Biblical scripture as the absolute authority on all moral questions; direct personal communication with God through daily prayer, (or by actual "possession" by the Holy Spirit as is the case with Pentecostal), and active missionary work in spreading the "Gospel9."

The current realignment of religious forces in Latin America away from Catholicism towards Protestant denominations, and the current shift in the make-up of Latin Protestants, reflects several different factors which all have worked to strengthen the Evangelical and Pentecostal wings of Latin American Protestantism.

2. The American Roots of Latin American Evangelicals.

The worldview and forms of activism of the "transnational," protestant churches in particular, but also of the pentecostal "indigenous" churches in Latin America, reveal their distinctly "North American" origins23, and reflect the roots of their "home churches" in the "revivalist" movements which brought religion to the "unchurched" populations on the American Frontier in the South and the West in the 19th and early twentieth century24. Evangelical protestantism stresses individual acts of conversion which lead to a transformation of personal behavior and values over collective action. This emphasis on personal improvement, as well as "health and prosperity" as heavenly gifts, make it pre-adapted to the entrepreneurial ethos of the "informal economy" upon which many of its poor Latin American adherents depend, and much less likely to draw the wrath of the police and authorities25. It also reflects the militant "anti-modernism" of "born again" Christians in the United States who make up the majority of the Americans who reject Darwin and the authority of modern science (according to recent polls some 44% of the US population prefer the Book of Genesis to the theory of evolution26).

In the United States of the 1920's, the "pietistic" frontier version of protestantism was forged into a militant worldview which rejected modern science and theology in defense of a traditional rural protestantism which was increasingly isolated in "post-protestant" America - an industrial society which was becoming both urbanized and religiously and ethnically pluralistic. To the leaders of the fundamentalist movement it seemed as though their "liberal" adversaries within the "mainline" schools of theology had joined scientific spokesmen for "evolutionism" and for progressive public education in a systematic effort to undermine belief in Christ's divinity and the authority of the Holy Gospel. This was understood as subverting the standing of fundamentalist preachers in the eyes of their local congregations and destroying their capacity to regulate the moral life of local communities27. "Liberal" secular assaults against religious authority demanded a militant cultural and political counter offensive, a "revitalization" movement directed against immigrant catholics, "demon rum," and the "pagan" popular culture of the Big Cities diffused by Hollywood and the new commercial media.

Conflicts in post-World One America over issues of cultural and religious identity reached a climax with the Scopes' "Monkey trial" which tested the legality of teaching "evolution" in Tennessee public schools in 1925. Despite a fundamentalist victory in the local courts, the trial brought the glare of the national media spotlight and the scorn of "modernist" opinion-makers. This victory was a cultural defeat which lead to a pattern of fundamentalist withdrawal from national politics into "spiritual enclaves" which were closed off to the commercial media and protected from contamination by "worldly values28."

In 1940, however, Southern-based fundamentalist churches in the US returned to the national arena when they won the right to use the public airwaves for religious broadcasting29. The post-war period saw the extensive use of Radio and television for "revivalist" campaigns and the creation of electronic "televangilist" churches30. More recently, in the post-cold war era since 1989, the fundamentalists' mastery of modern communication techniques has resulted in their becoming one of the largest and most active forces in international short-wave programming, beaming religious propaganda in favor of their version of the gospel worldwide31. In short, the North American, Protestant Fundamentalists have joined the traditional conversion "technology" of frontier "revivalism" to the modern communication media in order to establish themselves in new areas of evangelism both within the United States and overseas - especially in Latin America.

The politicalization of religious angst was (then as now), strongly associated with the responses of rural evangelical protestants to large scale secularizing changes in society and economy32, and represented the third such wave of protestant protest against widespread cultural change since the middle of the eighteenth century33. As before, this revival movement reflected the radical individualism built into American political culture. The Evangelical response to new social strains and cultural conflict was to displace them into the religious arena and translate them into matters of "individual salvation and rebirth, rather than collective struggle."

Needless to say, given current economic trends which bring not only prosperity but also growing poverty and social exclusion in Latin countries34, such "quietistic" protestant doctrines are ready-made vehicles for channeling the aspirations of the Latin American poor for a better life in directions which are politically "safe" as well as socially conservative35 In a political climate which is politically repressive and violent leaving little room for collective action by the poor, it also makes them socially attractive. This is especially true when evangelical doctrines are joined to local "self-help" programs, such as those sponsored by pentecostal congregations, or to social service networks supported by foreign missions36.

3. Church Competition and Political Conflicts in the Reagan Era.

The distance between the cultural outlooks on social issues between Evangelical protestants and Catholic "liberation theologians" was and is immense, and this difference assumed real political salience in response to the changes occurring within Latin American Catholicism after the Conference of Bishops in Medellin in 196837. The Catholic partisans of Liberation Theology responded to the institutional crisis of the Catholic Church with the creation of Ecclesiastical Base Communities which were meant to reach out to the "unchurched" poor, and were strongly supportive of political protests movements. During the same period, the "individualist" orientation of protestant evangelicals in Latin America was reinforced by the political alignment of the leadership of their home churches in the United States with the conservative coalition organized by the Republican Party38. This alignment encouraged both the de-politicalization of the Latin evangelicals around community empowerment and human rights issues39, and in some cases their eventual mobilization by local authoritarian regimes in the anti-communist crusades of the 1980's40.

This shift in the focus of evangelical activism from the spirtual realm to ideological warfare is symbolized for many by the success of the California based "Gospel Outreach Church" in converting General Efran Rios Montt of Guatamala in the months following the disastrous earthquake of 197641. The Gospel Outreach Church later played a critical intermediary role in 1982 helping to swing the Reagan White House in support of the Montt Regime following the military coup which brought him to power. It also successfully lobbied Congress to restore military aid to the new regime - in the midst of Rios Montt's genocidical "anti-insurgency" campaign of the early 1980's which claimed the lives of tens of thousands of indigenous Mayan indians42.

In the US in the years preceding the triumph of the Reagan wing of the Republican Party in 1980-81, the domestic focus of the political coalition between traditionalist evangelicals and conservative party activists was centered on "reproductive and sexual issues" - and in particular on opposition to the distribution of new rights and power to women and homosexuals which would challenge traditional gender roles and family structures. The three major issues were resistance to the passage of the "Equal Rights Amendment for Women, and judicial protection and recognition of Abortion and "Gay Rights43."

During the early years of the Reagan Administration during what some have called the "Second Cold War" from 1980-85, it was foreign and military policy that captivated the New Right and Conservative Activists. Both the Christian right and the secular neo-conservatives were preoccupied with the common struggle to combat communist insurgencies in the Central America, Africa and Afghanistan and the general campaign to de-legitimize existing Communist regimes worldwide44. American evangelicals co-operated enthusiastically with the Reagan White House and the State Department

Our understanding of full impact of this collaboration in Latin America is subject to major reservations: firstly, the ideological influence of the "norteamericanos" was much more important in the "transnational mission" churches than in the pentecostal churches whose leadership is largely indigenous46; second, the ideological attitudes of the leadership of these churches did not necessarily effect the political opinions of their lay congregations47. But they effected them enough to add a distinct ideological coloration to the pre-existing religious competition between Latin American evangelicals and catholics.

4. The 1990's: The New "Counter Reformation" and convergence between Evangelical and Catholic Conservatives.

The close alignment of North American Evangelicals, and of their missionary churches in Latin America, with the anti-communist foreign policy of the US White House came to an end with the close of the Cold War, and more importantly the resolution of the various local proxy wars which had been fought under its banner in the late 1980's in Central America48. This break the collaboration between Evangelical Christian and neo-conservative Cold War Warriors also ended the domination of the conservative coalition in the US by secular neo-conservative intellectuals. This has allowed for the emergence of Southern and Western fundamentalists such as Pat Robertson of the Christian Broadcast News and Ralph Reed, the political director of the Christian Coalition, as leading voices within the Republican party49. The end of the Cold War and this leadership shift, brought with them a renewed emphasis on the moralistic agenda of the defense of "family values" which had characterized the early years of the Evangelical/Conservative coalition in the 1970's.

This reemergence of this "spiritual" agenda coincided with developments within the Catholic Church which promised a potential political reconciliation between the competing wings of Latin American Christianity. In the later years of the papacy of Pope John Paul II, observers have described launching of a second "counter-reformation" against the "Liberation Theology" of the Latin Church which is generally hostile to Catholic social activism50. The Pope's appeal for a "new evangelism" has encouraged a shift in the Church toward a renewed emphasis on "spiritual values," and has strengthened existing resistance within the Latin Church hierarchy to the emphasis on collective movements of the poor, or to the continued growth of the Catholic CEB's51 - especially in countries like Brazil which are targets of Protestant Evangelical and Pentecostal missionaries.

At the same time, efforts in the US to strike a political bargain between Protestant fundamentalists and social conservatives within the Catholic Church around the anti-feminist, "pro-family" political agenda52 has had a marked feedback effect on the relations between these Churches in Latin America. The politicalization of the Churches in the US under conservative auspices has encouraged efforts from the "top/down" to calm the mutual "demonization of the Other" common to both Latin Catholics and Protestants, and to atone for "sins against the unity that Christ intends for all his disciples53." Efforts such as the 1994 Joint Statement by Catholic and evangelical Protestant Scholars have sought to find a common ground for collaboration between Catholics and evangelical Protestants in defense of strong family values and in opposition to spread of abortion and contraception practices among Latin Women54.

It is worth noting here that the rate of abortion among Latin American women is equal to or in some cases higher than the rate among women in the United States. Indeed current estimates suggest that 2.8 million induced abortions per year are occurring in the six major Latin countries, Brazil, Columbia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and the Dominican Republic, and perhaps as many as four million in Latin America as a whole. The prevalence of abortion and the relative success of family planning programs have brought down the average fertility rate in Latin America from over six children per fertile mother in the 1960's to a little over three today55. These developments are good news from the point of view of slowing the population boom in Latin America, but represent a serious challenge both to Papal views on abortion and Church teaching on family planning and sexuality - teachings which share a common emphasis on traditional family structures and on the centrality of women's caregiving and reproductive roles with the Evangelical Protestant Churches56. The focus on reproductive and "family" issues creates a common ground for Catholic evangelical cooperation in political as well as cultural areas, and an historic opportunity to identify values which can unite Catholic conservatives and Evangelical traditionalists in opposition to changes in social norms which challenge their claim to regulate family and community life.

5. The Latin Connection and Religious Trends in the United States.

So far our analysis of religious trends and their political outcomes in Latin America has emphasized the "North American connection." But it also is important to recognize that these developments are taking place in the context of a larger "exchange" of goods, information, and populations between the Anglo North and Latin America. The surge in Latin American immigration to the United States over the past two decades have brought the numbers of "Hispanics" within the US to an historic high - currently 9% of their total population. This makes the United States with its 22 million or so Hispanophones the fifth largest Spanish speaking country in the world after Mexico, Spain, Argentina and Columbia. The 12.5 million Hispanics Catholics in the United States now represent the largest "ethnic community" among the 46 million American Catholics, almost 25 % of the total forcing a change in the focus and the cultural style of the Irish Catholic dominated American hierarchy57.

At the same time Pentecostal Churches have made important gains in membership among Hispanic immigrants of Central American and Caribbean origin (they have recruited over one third of North American Hispanics58) - with effects which reach far beyond the urban neighborhoods in cities like New York or Los Angeles where these immigrants are concentrated. They also impact "back' on the their countries of origin since recent Latin immigrants to the United States typically move back and forth across national frontiers linking developments in their US barrios to their home communities in the Mexican, Salvadorian or Dominican countryside. And of course, this works in the opposite direction, as the dispersal of latin immigrants from US cities make rural areas of Upstate New York or the Central Valley of interior California subject to influences which originated in the cities of Puerto Rico, Mexico, Peru and Columbia.

6. Globalization and Fundamentalist impulse.

I would like to conclude my remarks with some thoughts about the paradoxes created by the linkage between globalization and the resurgence of local "traditionalist" movements which are "fundamentalist" in both their religious doctrines and political identities. The rise of religious fundamentalism linked to conservative political movements in both North and South America is inextricably linked to the cultural and economic interpentration of each other societies which is itself an unforeseen by-product of the globalization of communication, capital and currency markets and of national labor forces. As the British sociologist Anthony Giddens recently in his work Beyond Left and Right:

Globalization concerns not only the creation of large scale transnational networks, but the transformation of the local and even the personal contexts of social experience. Our quotidien activities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the Globe59.

Conversely, one can argue that local life styles have become "globally consequential" in a process of "glo-localization" whereby the habits and customs of the third world countryside reshape urban neighborhoods in Northern metropolis, even as the consumer culture and urban architectural models of the industrial North rework the skylines of the teeming Southern mega-cities. The spread of a "global consumer" culture is what Benjamin Barber has called "MacWorld" - whose cultural icons and forms are frequently of North American in origin, and whose "global" label is mainly a "flag of convenience" for American trans-national media conglomerates. In the face of these forces, the revival of local nationalisms or traditionalisms which emphasize the defense of local identities and traditional life worlds can occur in one national context and then find themselves transplanted outside their original context by a global patterns of immigration. Their impacts are difficult to anticipate - as for instance when conservative rural peasants from upper Egypt are cast up in New Jersey suburbs within sight of the World Trade Center Towers.

Giddens claims that we live in a "post-traditional" social order in which local traditions don't so much disappear as instead change their status. Confronted with direct contact with cultural or religious traditions which once were kept at a safe remove - the adherents of different traditions are now forced to explain themselves "and become open to interrogation and dialogue with others61." The fundamentalist impulse is rooted in a refusal to open one's own tradition to interrogation by outsiders, in a refusal, in other words, to abide the rules that govern the great exchange of ideas and values which characterizes our de-traditional world. More particularly it is a refusal to allow the authority of traditional doxa to be questioned or reformed in the light of contemporary movements of public opinion. Fundamentalism is tradition defended in a "traditionalist" way, but often disseminated by the most modern communication technologies and organizational and propaganda techniques that modernity has to offer. This translates as a refusal of dialogue in a global world which is post-traditional.

The protestant fundamentalism which was born on the American frontier, and tested in the cultural wars within the United States over the past century, is a modern ideology which systematically and self-consciously refuses the authority or modern scientific culture even as it denies the validity of any religious tradition except its own. It uses its command of modern communication media primarily to spread its version of the gospel, but also in support of the demand that the state cease to be neutral in struggle over cultural norms, and use it power to enforce traditional moral rules in ways which would stigmatize the "deviant", and stabilize traditional gender power roles.

In the end, we might ask ourselves whether the reversal of forces suggested by the evidence of Catholic decline and of an historic breakthrough by Protestant evangelicals in Latin America - an historic cultural and religious realignment - does not necessarily imply a conservative realignment of political and social forces which will work against the growth of the Democratic Left among the urban poor and marginalized working classes of these countries - as it has already done north of the border in the United States.

Notes
  1. See Barry Kosmin and Seymour Lachman, One Nation Under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society, Harmony Books, New York, 1993, pps 12-13 & 191-93.
  2. See Carlos Alberto Torres, (Trans. Richard A. Young), The Church, Society and Hegemony: A Critical Sociology of Religion in Latin America, Praeger Publishers, Westport Conn. 1992, Chap. 4.
  3. See Paul E. Sigmund, Liberation Theology at the Crossroads: Democracy or Revolution, Oxford University Press, 1990, pps 16-17.
  4. See J. Samuel Escobar, "The Church in Latin America," in Guillermo Cook, ibid, pps. 29-31.
  5. See for instance, Jos‚ Miguel Bonino, "The Condition and Prospects of Christianity in Latin America,"in Guillermo Cook, ibid, pps 261-62.
  6. See J. Samuel Escobar, ibid, pps 34-35.
  7. See Cook, op cit. page X.
  8. See Escobar, op cit. page 27.
  9. See Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right-wing Movements and Political Power in the United States, The Guilford Press, New York, 1995. page 163.
  10. Gustav Niebuhr, "A Ceremony in Mexico City Shows Growth in Mormonism," The New York Times, Dec. 11th 1994, page 36.
  11. Guillermo Cook, "Introduction" in Guillermo Cook, editor, The Changing Face of The Church in Latin America, Orbis Books, Maryknoll New York, 1994, pps IX-X.
  12. Juan Sep—lveda, "The Pentecostal Movement in Latin America," in Guillermo Cook, edit, ibid, page 68.
  13. J. Samuel Escobar, "Conflict of Interpretations of Popular Protestantism, in Guillermo Cook, edit, ibid, page 112.
  14. See Guillermo Cook, "Protestant Mission and Evangelization," Cook, edit, ibid pps 43-44.
  15. See William Swatos Jr. "On Latin American Protestantism," in Religion & Democracy in Latin America, William Swatos Jr. edit. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N.J., 1995, pps. 152-53.
  16. J. Samuel Escobar, "The Church in Latin America," in Cook, edit. ibid, pps 27-28.
  17. Mike Berg and Paul Prietz, "Five Waves of Protestant Evangelization," in Cook, edit. ibid, pps 62-63.
  18. J. Samuel Escobar, "Conflict of Interpretations of Popular Protestantism," Cook, edit, ibid, pps 117-19.
  19. See Paul Sigmund, Liberation Theology at the Crossroads, ibid, pps 29-31 & 83-89.
  20. See Pablo Richard and Team, "Challenges to Liberation Theology in the Decade of Nineties," Guillermo Cook, edit. ibid, pps 245-52, and also Sigmund, ibid, Chapter four.
  21. Berg and Prietz, op cit.
  22. See Cook, op cit, page xi.
  23. William Swatos Jr. op cit.
  24. See Kosman and Lachman, One Nation Under God, ibid, pps 33-34.
  25. See Christian Smith, "The Spirit and Democracy," in Swatos, edit, ibid, pps 9 & 15.
  26. See for instance, Harry Holloway & John George, Public Opinion: Coalitions, Elites, and Masses, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986, pps 79-81.
  27. See Theodore Lowi on the significance of local "conservatism" in the United States in The End of the Republican Era, University of Oklahoma Press, 1995. pps 23-32.
  28. See Diamond, ibid, pps 93-95.
  29. Diamond, ibid, page 95.
  30. Diamond, ibid, pps. 162-65.
  31. See David Binder, "Shortwave Radio: More Preachers, Less Propaganda," The New York Times, August 28, 1994, Sunday News of the Week Section, page 4.
  32. See Appendix A, "Social Stress and Political Response: Religion and the 1980 Election, in The Hidden Election, Rogers and Cohen, edit. Pantheon Books, New York, 1981,.pps 137-38.
  33. See Kevin Phillips' discussion in, Post Conservative America, Vintage Books, New York, 1983. pp 181-82.
  34. In 1986 37% of Latin America's population was living in poverty; by the year 2000, this figure may well rise to 38%, or roughly 192 million people. See "A Boom for the Few," The New York Times, September 7, 1994, page 1.
  35. See Cook, op cit, page xi.
  36. See Guillermo Cook, "The Many Faces of the Latin American Church," ibid, pps 272-73.
  37. Sigmund, ibid, page 28-29.
  38. See Christian Smith's admission on this point and his rebuttal, ibid, pps 11-13.
  39. See Guillermo Cook, "The Genesis and Practice of Protestant Base Communities in Latin America," in Cook, edit, ibid, pps 152-53.
  40. See P.A. Dieros, "Protestant Fundamentalism In Latin America," in M. E. Marty and Scott Appleby, editors, Fundamentalisms Observed, University of Chicago Press, 1992, pps 142-96.
  41. See P.A. Dieros, op cit, but also Sara Diamond, ibid, 237-38.
  42. Diamond, op cit.
  43. Sara Diamond, ibid, pps 166-76.
  44. Diamond, ibid, pps. 214-225.
  45. Diamond, ibid, pps 239-41.
  46. See Jos‚ Bonino, ibid, pps 264-65.
  47. Christian Smith, op cit. page 12.
  48. Diamond, ibid, pps. 254-55.
  49. See Michael Lind, "Why Intellectual Conservatism Died," Dissent, Winter Issue, 1995, pps 42-47.
  50. See Guillermo Cook, "The Many Faces of the Latin American Church," in Cook, ibid, page 269. For a description of the repressive climate in today's Vatican, see also Paul Wilkes' portrait in "The Popemakers," The New York Times, Dec. 11, 1994, Sunday magazine, page 62.
  51. See Jos‚ Miquel Bonino, op cit. pps 262-63.
  52. See for a general discussion of the convergence in the US between social and theologically conservative christians and jews across religious and denominational lines, see James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America, Basic Books, 1991, pps 31-52.
  53. See Peter Steinfels, "Catholic and Evangelical: Seeking the Middle Ground," The New York Times, March 30, 1994, page 12.
  54. "Besides mentioning abortion and parental choice in schooling, the statement welcomed " a growing convergence: between evangelical and Catholics in opposing views of Church/State separation that exclude religion from public life." Steinfels, The New York Times, op cit.
  55. See. Elizabeth Brooks, "Latin America may outface the United States in Abortions," The New York Times, April 12, 1994, page 5.
  56. Elizabeth Brooke, The New York Times, op cit.
  57. Ari Goldman, "Religion Notes," The New York Times, March 26, 1994, page. 26.
  58. Kosman and Lachman, ibid, pps 126-28 & 137-38.
  59. Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics, Stamford University Press, Stamford, California, 1994. pps 4-5.
  60. Giddens, op cit. page 5.

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